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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from Judge Lewis' Order denying Defendants, Tracy Cannon's 
I I 
and Cannon & Associates' (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Cannons") request for attorney 
fees. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article VIII § 5 of 
the Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(j) (1996); and Rules 3 
and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Did Judge Lewis correctly determine that Wardley's claims in this case were not 
"without merit" and were not pursued in bad faith as required for an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Anno. 78-27-56 (1996). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Cannons incorrectly identify the standard of review as a legal question that should 
be reviewed for correctness. [Cannons' Brief at p. 1]. (citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 315 (Utah 1998) and Robertson v. Gem Ins, Co,, 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992)). 
While "the without merit determination is a question of law" reviewed for correctness, Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1991), the trial court's finding regarding "bad faith is a question 
of fact and is reviewed by [the appellate courts] under the "clearly erroneous" standard." Id. 
(citing Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 (Utah 1987); and Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989) (determination of bad faith reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion)). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court noted that a "finding of bad faith is a 
mixed question of law and fact that turns on a factual determination ot a party's subjective 
intent." Valcarce 961 P.2d at 315-16 (citing Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 
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App.1989)). Furthermore, in the more recent case of Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 
932 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the appropriate standard of review for an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code. Anno. § 78-27-56 by stating that "[t]o clarify the 
matter: As to whether the party lacked good faith, the trial court must make a factual finding of 
a party's subjective intent. In addition, the trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
action was without merit." IcL (emphasis added). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 governs the award of attorneys fees where a 
meritless case is pursued by a party in bad faith. It states: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted 
in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection 
(i) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
OBJECTION TO CANNONS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 
Wardley objects to the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts as set forth 
in Cannons' Brief because those sections of Cannons' Brief twist, misrepresent, confuse and 
ignore the evidence and the trial court's rulings. 
Examples of the objectionable and distorted representations include the following: 
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(1) "Wardley's lawsuit amounted to an effort to capitalize on fraudulent and 
deceptive practices." [Cannons' Brief, p. 2]. 
There was no such finding or determination by the trial court and no evidence to support such an 
allegation was ever submitted at trial. In fact, the trial court found that "[t]he record does not 
provide any credible support for a finding that Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, 
defraud or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of Cannon. [R. 1175], 
(2) "At trial, the court found that Wardley [] had altered the dates of certain listing 
agreements and fraudulently induced the Mascaros to enter into the listing 
agreements." [Id.]. 
The trial court did conclude that Hansen altered an expiration date on one Listing Agreement and 
inserted expiration dates to which the Mascaros did not agree on the other three Listing 
Agreements which they signed. There was not, however, any finding or evidence that Wardley 
altered dates or otherwise acted improperly. Furthermore, there were numerous other documents, 
including options, letters, Real Estate Purchase Contracts, disclosures, and other information (95 
Exhibits were marked and 65 Exhibits were received) which created numerous factual and legal 
questions that were only resolved by a four day jury trial and a long period when all the evidence 
was taken under advisement. [R. 847-50]. 
(3) "the trial court dismissed Wardley's meritless claims..." [Id.]. 
The trial court found that Wardley had not met its burden of proof for some of the claims it had 
asserted but specifically determined that Wardley's claims had merit and were not frivolous or of 
little weight or importance and they had a basis in law and/or fact. [R. 1173-74]. 
(4) "that Wardley, as opposed to its agent Hansen, did not act in bad faith in 
bringing this action." [Id.]. 
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In light of all the evidence, exhibits, claims and testimony, the trial court did not find that either 
Wardley or Hansen pursued their claims or presented their defense in "bad faith." 
(5) "The trial court found that through its agent, Wardley took full advantage of its 
opportunity to deceive the Mascaros . . . when Wardley knew that the Mascaros' 
legal counsel would most likely not be present" [Cannons' Brief, p. 4]. 
As stated above, the trial court found some discrepancies between the dates on the listing 
contracts and the Mascaro's expectations in signing them, however, only determined that this 
irregularity made those contracts voidable, not void and never concluded that either Wardley or 
Hansen took "full advantage to deceive the Mascaros" when their counsel was not present. 
(6) "Wardley did not have any viable economic relations with the Mascaros..." 
[Id]. 
As stated above, the trial court found that the incorrect dates on the Listing Agreements between 
Wardley and the Mascaros made those contracts voidable, not void. Therefore, at some level 
there were viable economic relations between Wardley and the Mascaros. 
(7) "the trial court entered its order denying Cannons' Motion for attorney's fees, 
ruling that Wardley was not responsible for the fraudulent conduct of its agent 
because it did not participate in its agent's fraudulent conduct, did not know its 
agent was engaging in fraudulent conduct, and did not have reason to know that 
its agent had engaged in fraudulent conduct. [Cannons' Brief, p. 5]. 
While it is true that Wardley did not participate in or have actual or constructive knowledge of 
any wrongful conduct, the trial court's decision that Wardley did not pursue meritless claims in 
bad faith was based upon the totality of the evidence submitted in two dispositive motions and 
after four days of trial testimony. 
NATURE , PROCEEDINGS. FACTS AND DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW 
This case was originally filed by Wardley against Defendants Leland and Sheri 
Mascaro ("the Mascaros") to recover a real estate commission Wardley believed it was entitled to 
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because of four Listing Agreements signed by the Mascaros. [R. 12-15 and 287-90]. The 
Mascaros Answered Wardley's Complaint and asserted a Counterclaim against Wardley and a 
Third-Party Claim against Third-Party Defendants, Ruth and Aries Hansen ("the Hansens") who 
were licensed real estate agents affiliated with Wardley. [R. 28-39]. The Mascaros1 claims 
i 
against Wardley and the Hansens included Negligence, Fraud, Breach of Contract, and a 
Declaratory Judgment. [Id.]. Thereafter, Wardley filed an Amended Complaint asserting 
additional claims against Defendant/Appellant Tracey Cannon for Unlawful Interference with 
Contract, Conspiracy and Declaratory Judgment. [R. 81-90]. Tracey Cannon Answered 
Wardley's Complaint but did not assert a Counterclaim against Wardley nor a Crossclaim against 
the Hansens. [R. 104-09]. 
Tracey Cannon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging there were no 
material facts which, if proven, would entitle Wardley to a judgment against her. [R. 116-33]. 
The trial court denied Tracey Cannon's Motion for Summary Judgment because "there [were] 
material facts at issue, including what defendant, Cannon, knew or should have known and when 
she obtained any knowledge she had, etc." [R. 268-70]. 
Wardley then received permission to and did file a Second Amended Complaint 
which added Cannon Associates as a Defendant and added claims against Cannons for violation 
of statutes and for conversion. [R. 277-82]. Cannons answered Wardley's Second Amended 
Complaint without asserting a Counterclaim against Wardley or a Crossclaim against the 
Hansens. [R. 302-09]. 
Wardley and the Hansens then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to 
have the Mascaros' Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims dismissed. [R. 526-69]. After oral 
-5-
argument on Wardley's and Hansens' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court dismissed 
the negligence claims but found there were questions of fact regarding the Mascaros' claims for 
breach of contract and for fraud. [R. 661-78]. 
This case was then tried before Judge Leslie Lewis for four days, from June 8-11, 







Ruth Mary Hansen; 
Rod Foster Gordon; 
Gage Froerer; 
Michael Brodsky; 
Rodney Butch Dailey; 
Tracey Cannon; 
Mitchel J. Olsen; and 
Dougan Jones. 
[R. 845-46, 851-52, 895 and 926-27]. Additionally, 95 Exhibits were marked, 65 of which were 
received into evidence. [R. 847-50]. 
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At the close of Wardley's case in chief, the Mascaro's and Cannons moved for 
directed verdicts. The trial court did not grant the Defendants' request, but took them under 
advisement. [R. 926-27]. . 
After presentation of all the evidence and closing arguments, Judge Lewis found 
no cause of action against Tracey Cannon on the violation of statute or rule claims and 
determined that Wardley had failed to meet its burdens of proof on its claims against Cannons for 
interference with contracts or conversion. Judge Lewis, however, took Wardley's claims against 
Mascaro's and Cannons related to the listing contracts under advisement. [R. 927 and 937-38]. 
The trial court kept the pending claims under advisement for 68 days and on 
August 28, 1998, issued a Memorandum Decision which concluded that the Listing Contracts 
signed by the Mascaros were voidable and unenforceable because they did not accurately reflect 
the Mascaros' understanding that they would only be one day listings. [R. 945-51]. Consequently, 
Wardley's claim against Cannons also failed. The trial court also ruled that the Mascaros were 
not entitled to recover any amount from Wardley or the Hansens on their Counterclaims and 
Third-Party Claims for breach of contract and fraud. [R. 951-53]. 
Thereafter, the Mascaros and Cannons' requested attorney fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Anno. § 78-27-56. [R. 972-78 and 979-1080]. After the issue was fully briefed [R. 1091-
1111, 1121-23 and 1154-61]. Judge Lewis Ruled that the Mascaros and Cannons were not 
entitled to attorney fees pursuant to § 78-27-56 because the Court could not conclude that 
"Wardley's suit was without merit" [R. 1173]. and "was not asserted or pursued with the requisite 
bad faith." [R. 1174-75]. Judge Lewis specifically found that the Defendants "failed to show that 
Wardley's claims under the listing agreements were frivolous or of little weight or importance 
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having no basis in law or fact." [R. 1173-74 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1983)). The trial court supported that conclusion by noting "that the listing agreements entered 
into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because of Mr. Hansen's misconduct, 
[but] the legality of the listing agreements, a mixed fact and legal question, was not entirely 
clear." [Id.]. The trial court went on to explain that its decision was reached "only after 
extensively evaluating the trial testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents 
entered into evidence, in light of the law." [Id.]. 
Judge Lewis' Ruling regarding Wardley's lack of bad faith in pursuing its claims 
states "[the record does not provide any credible support for a finding that Wardley pursued its 
claims to hinder, delay, defraud, or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of Cannon or the 
Mascaros" and that it would not be equitatble to award the Defendants their attorney fees from 
Wardley. [R. 1175]. 
Cannons appealed the trial court's denial of their request for attorney fees pursuant 
to Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court order complained of by Cannons involves both legal and factual 
questions. In order to overturn a trial court's factual determinations an appellant must marshal all 
the evidence which supports the determination to demonstrate it cannot stand. In this case, 
however, Cannons did not include any portion of the four days of trial testimony or any of the 65 
exhibits admitted at the trial of this case. Cannons' failure to marshal should lead this Court to 
affirm the trial court's findings. 
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The trial court's determinations that Wardley's claims were meritorious and were 
not pursued in bad faith are supported by the facts, evidence and the record and should not be 
overturned on appeal. 
Wardley should not be punished for the wrongful conduct it did not know about, 
did not ratify or support in some way. The appropriate party, if any, that should have been 
responsible for Cannons' attorney fees is Hansen. Nevertheless, Cannons' failure to file claims 
against him preclude them from recovery in this case. 
The trial court found, and set forth in the record, several factors which justify its 
decision not to award Cannons' attorney fees against Wardley. Those factors include the 
complexity of the facts and legal issues, Wardley's lack of knowledge of wrongdoing, its lack of 
participation in any wrongdoing and its honest good faith belief in the claims it was pursuing. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. CANNONS' FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS FATAL TO 
THEIR APPEAL 
In order to challenge the finding of a trial court, the appellant must "marshal the 
evidence, citing the appellate court to all the evidence in the record that would support the 
determination reached by the trial court and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to support the finding under attack. Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) (citing 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,116 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991); Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 
App.1990); and Harker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah 
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App. 1987)). "In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley, 818 P.2d 
at 1315. 
In this case Cannons appeal the trial court's denial of their request for attorney 
fees which was based upon the determination that Wardley had not pursued a meritless claim in 
bad faith.1 Whether a claim is without merit is a question of law which this Court should review 
for correctness. Whether or not a claim is pursued in bad faith, however, is a "question of fact 
and is reviewed by [the appellate] court under the clearly erroneous standard. Jeschke, 811 P.2d 
at 204. "The party challenging the trial court's findings of fact 'must show that the evidence, 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, is legally insufficient to support the contested 
finding.'" Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Dep't ofSoc. 
Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App.1991)). In order to prevail in this Appeal, 
Cannons needed to marshal all the evidence which supports the trial court's decision that 
Wardley's claims were meritorious and not pursued in bad faith, then show how that the finding 
is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Cannons, however, have 
not marshaled any evidence supporting the trial court's decision. 
This dispute involved several dispositive motions, sixty five exhibits and four 
days of trial testimony. Even then, the trial court needed a significant amount of time to sort 
through all of the evidence before it could make a ruling. Rather than provide this Court with the 
trial testimony or the exhibits upon which the trial court's decision was based, Cannons have 
1
 The basis for finding a claim meritless and the standard to determine whether an action 
is pursued in bad faith are dealt with separately below. 
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relied only upon the trial court's finding that Hansen inserted dates on four listing agreements that 
were inconsistent with the Mascaro's understanding. Cannons failed to point out the various Real 
Estate Purchase Contracts that the Hansens presented to the Mascaros. [R. 847-50]. They 
ignored the fact that the Mascaros believed they had a contract with Wardley or they would not 
have filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. [R. 28-39]. They also disregarded the 
numerous other efforts and steps which the Hansens took to help the Mascaros sell their property. 
[R. 661-77]. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Cannons did not provide this Court with any 
of the trial testimony, which formulated the basis for the trial court's decision. [R. 1409-11; 
Notice of No Transcript Requested]. 
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). After carefully considering all the evidence presented in this 
case the trial court determined that the claims pursued by Wardley had merit "they were not 
frivilous or of little weight or significance" and were not pursued in bad faith. [R. 1171-77 and 
1265-67]. "If the party challenging the finding fails to marshal the supporting evidence, the trial 
court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah 
App. 1995); (citing Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah App.1991)). Because Cannons 
have not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, this Court should assume 
that the record supports the trial court and uphold the decision denying Cannons the attorney fees 
requested. 
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II. CANNONS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FROM 
WARDLEY BECAUSE ITS CLAIMS WERE MERITORIOUS AND 
WERE NOT PURSUED IN BAD FAITH 
In order to award attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 three 
requirements must be met: "(1) the party seeking fees prevailed; (2) the claim or defense asserted 
by the opposing party was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad faith." 
Chipman, 934 P.2d at 1161. In order to prove a claim is without merit, a party must show that 
the claim is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady, 
671 P.2d at 151. The instant case involved complex factual and legal issues, including the 
alleged modification of the Listing Agreements, the enforceability of the Listing Agreements, 
whether Cannons interfered with another buyer's purchase of the property, whether the Mascaros 
refused to sell their property to a ready, willing and able buyer brought into the transaction by 
Wardley, and whether Cannons interfered with the Wardley/Mascaro Listing Agreement. [R. 
268-70, 271-92, 636 and 661-77]. Reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court did not conclude 
that Wardleys claims were "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." [R. 1173-74 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151)]. The legality of the Listing Agreements 
upon which Wardleys claims were based, presented mixed questions of fact and law which were 
only resolved by the trial court after "extensively evaluating the trial testimony and carefully 
scrutinizing the numerous documents entered into evidence, in light of the law." [Id]. Even 
without the benefit of the trial testimony and numerous documents upon which the trial court's 
decision was based the meritorious nature of Wardley's claims is obvious and should be 
recognized by this Court. 
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Even if Wardle^s claims lack merit, before attorney fees can be awarded pursuant 
to Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56,, there must be a factual finding that Wardley did not have a 
good faith belief in its claims. "Finding a lack of good faith turns on subjective intent" and for 
purposes of § 78-27-56 is synonymous with a finding of "bad faith." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52. 
See also Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171 and Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-16. To find that Wardley acted 
in "bad faith" by pursuing these claims "the trial court must find that one or more of the 
following factors existed: (I) the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 
question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party 
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or 
defraud others." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151). There was no 
evidence presented below, and none before this Court, that Wardley lacked an honest belief in 
the propriety of its claims, that it intended to take unconscionable advantage of anyone or that it 
knew its actions would hinder, delay or defraud others. To the contrary, the trial court found that 
even though Hansen had improperly modified/inserted dates on the Listing Agreements, when all 
the evidence was considered, Wardley had a good faith basis from which to pursue the claims 
involved in this action. This Court, therefore, should affirm the trial court's decision denying 
Cannons' request for attorney fees. 
In the Cady case, like in this case, a realty company sued for a commission from a 
prospective seller of real property. The trial court in that case found that the realtor's claims were 
meritless and awarded the defendant its attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court, however, 
reversed and held that even though the suit may have been ill conceived and without merit, there 
was no proof of bad faith to support an award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court explained: 
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[i]n the instant case, the trial court found lack of good faith because 
had plaintiffs researched the issue as instructed at pre-trial 
conference, they would have discovered they had no valid claim 
and they could have saved the court valuable time by avoiding trial. 
We disagree that this conduct constitutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were 
clearly pursuing a meritless claim and better preparation might well 
have disclosed that to them. However, that conduct does not rise 
to lack of good faith. The evidence must also affirmatively 
establish a lack of at least one of the three elements of good faith 
heretofore discussed. There was no evidence that plaintiffs lacked 
an honest (although ill-formed) belief in their claim; that they had 
an intent to take an unconscionable advantage of defendants; nor 
that they had the intent to, or knowledge that their suit would 
hinder, delay or defraud defendants. 
Cady9 671 P.2d at 152; (citing Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 433 
P.2d 901, 904 (1967). Even if Wardley's claims were poorly researched and/or ill-formed, the 
honest belief that a commission was due from the Mascaros and or Cannons defeats Cannons1 
claim for attorney fees in this case. 
III. CANNONS1 RELIANCE UPON PRINCIPLES OF VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY ARE MISPLACED AND WERE NOT A PART OF THE 
PROCEEDING BELOW 
The doctrine of vicarious liability by which employers and principals are held 
liable for the harmful conduct of their employees and agents committed within the coarse and 
scope of their employment provides a basis for tort liability. It does not automatically apply in all 
circumstances. For example, an employer will only be held responsible for punitive damages 
resulting from an employee's conduct in Ihe following four circumstances: 
(a) if the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act; 
(b) if the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in 
employing or retaining him; 
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(c) if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope 
of employment; or 
(d) if the principal or a managerial agent of the principal knowingly ratified or 
approved the act. 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co. , 811 P.2d 151, 63 (Utah 1991); (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 217C (1958)). The award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Anno § 78-27-56 is 
much closer to an award of punitive damages than to an award for tortious conduct. Recovery of 
attorney fees under § 78-27-56 is punitive rather than remunerative and is only available when a 
party acts so far outside the bounds of acceptable conduct that a sanction would be appropriate. 
Even if the single factual finding that Hansen placed incorrect dates upon the Listing Agreement, 
equates to a meritless action being filed in bad faith, the wrongdoer, in this case, Hansen, should 
be the one held responsible, 
Cannons may complain that they cannot collect from Hansen. Cannons' inability 
to collect from Hansen, however, is entirely their own fault for not filing a crossclaim against 
Hansen like the Mascaros did. If Cannons had asserted a claim against Hansen, recovery of 
awardable fees would be possible. Wardley should not be forced to answer for Cannons' failure 
to avail themselves of relevant legal remedies. 
IV. EVEN IF WARDLEY IS DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR HANSEN'S CONDUCT THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED 
THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES 
COUPLED WITH HANSEN'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT 
PRECLUDED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS CASE 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 provides for the award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party when the opposing party has pursued a meritless action which was not brought 
or asserted in good faith. Subsection 2 of that code section, however, states that the "court, in its 
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discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under subsection (1), but only if the 
court: ...(b) enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under provisions of Subsection 
(1)." Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56(2). hi the instant case the trial court entered findings which 
justify not awarding any fees against Wardley in this case. Those findings included: 
1. Wardley's suit was not without merit; [R. 1173]. 
2. The evidence did not support the contention that Wardley's claims were 
frivolous of little weight; [R. 1173-74]. 
3. Wardley did not have knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent conduct; [R. 
1174]. 
4. Wardley strongly believed it had a claim for unpaid commissions; [Id.]. 
5. Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements, which 
on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed with 20/20 
hindsight and the benefit of approximately four days of trial testimony; 
[Id]-
6. Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith; [Id], and 
7. The record does not provide any credible support for a finding that 
Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud or otherwise take 
unconscionable advantage of Cannon. [R. 1175]. 
See also &• 1265-67. 
Wardley has already expended a significant amount on attorney fees as a result of 
Hansen's conduct. In the interests of justice and for the reasons set forth above this Court should 
determine that even if Wardley is somehow responsible for Hansen's conduct, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by not awarding the attorney fees requested by Cannons. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
Cannons' appeal should be denied and the lower court ruling upheld because 
Cannons failed to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's decisions. Additionally, 
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this Court should affirm the trial court's decision that Wardle/s claims were meritorious and not 
pursued in bad faith. Alternatively this Court should hold that Wardley is not responsible 
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior to pay for Cannons' attorney fees resulting from 
Hansen's conduct that it did not know about or ratify. Finally, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's decision and findings that the facts of this case and justice compel the decision that 
Wardley should not be required to pay Cannons1 attorney fees in this case. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29, Utah R. App. P. Wardley hereby requests oral argument on 
this Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^> day of August, 2000. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C 
Attorneys for Appellee/Wardley 
Steven B. Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2000, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were deposited in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Mark O. Morris 
David N Wolf 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John Bucher 
1343 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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James C. Haskins 
357 South 200 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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This case came before the Court for hearing on November 5, 
1997/ on the Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Counterclaims and 
Third-Party Complaint. The Court heard argument and ruled from the 
bench that summary judgment was granted as to the defendants' and 
counterclaimant's (Mascaros') negligence claim. The remainder of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was taken under advisement. The 
Court, having now reviewed the plaintiff's Motion and the Mascaros' 
Memorandum in Opposition and having heard and reflected upon the 
law and argument from counsel, rules as stated herein. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied for reasons 
more fully articulated in this Ruling. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In their Third Party Complaint and Counterclaim, the Mascaros 
allege that plaintiff Wardley Better Homes and Gardens, through 
third-party defendants Ruth and Aries Hansen, contacted them 
concerning the sale of property that they owned ("the Property'). 
It appears that the Hansens were real estate agents representing 
either Wetcor Development or Michael Ahlin, the potential buyer of 
the Property. (Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint at para. 
55) . 
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On November 14, 1993, the Mascaros and Wardley Better Homes 
and Gardens entered into four agreements, each entitled "Listing 
Agreement & Agency Disclosure". All four agreements are 
collectively referred to as "the listing agreements". 
The first listing agreement covered 40 acres of the Property 
and was presented to the Mascaros at the same time as Wetcor 
Development's offer to purchase the Property, which came in the 
form of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement. (Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint at para. 60). The remaining three agreements were 
presented to the Mascaros at the same time as an offer to enter 
into an option agreement. The terms of these listing agreements 
corresponded in price and acreage with the proposed option 
agreement. While the described property varied, the remaining 
terms and conditions in the listing agreements were the same. See 
Listing Agreements. 
The Mascaros claim that the Hansens did not represent or 
disclose to them that the listing agreements were exclusive or for 
a term of more than one day or that it covered sales to any buyer 
of the property other than Wetcor Development or Michael Ahlm. 
(Counterclaim at para. 62) . The Mascaros signed the listing 
agreements and accepted both the Real Estate Purchase Agreement and 
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the Option. The buyer of the Property subsequently assigned his 
purchase and option agreements with the Mascaros. The closing date 
of May 15, 1994, passed with neither the buyer nor its assignee 
closing on the first 40 acres of the Property. 
On May 19, 1994, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the 
Hansens advised the Mascaros that another buyer had been located 
and that this buyer's offer on the Property would be presented. 
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens claims that the Mascaros instead 
conveyed the Property to a third-party purchaser, defendant Tracey 
Cannon. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Standard of RBViev 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court 
evaluates the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 101 
(Utah App. 1988). Additionally, the Court recognizes that "summary 
judgment is appropriate only where there are no issues of genuine 
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Gold Standard, Inc. V, Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1063 
(Utah 1996). Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that the law is 
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well-settled that in a motion for summary judgment, a trial court's 
analysis does not involve weighing any disputed evidence. A trial 
court's only inquiry should be whether material issues of fact 
exist. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 
(Utah 1995) citing W.M. Barnes Co. V. Sohio Nat'1 Resources Co., 
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981)). 
1. Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment concerning the breach of contract claim is denied. 
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens and the Hansens argue that the Mascaro's claim of breach of 
contract must fail as a matter of law because the listing 
agreements did not require them to ascertain whether a potential 
buyer would be able to perform its obligations in closing on the 
sale transaction. The Mascaros respond in their Memorandum in 
Opposition that Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens 
breached the listing agreements by not presenting a ready, willing 
and able buyer. 
The Court finds that the Mascaros' analysis confuses Wardley 
Better Homes and Gardens' and the Hansens' contractual obligations 
to not only procure a buyer who was ready, willing and able, but 
also to evaluate the financial stability of the buyer, advise the 
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Mascaros on the technicalities of a 1031 exchange, and coordinate 
the potential buyer's actions in satisfying the closing 
contingencies. The Court finds that absent a contractual provision 
to the contrary, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens 
were not insurers of the potential buyer's subsequent performance 
of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement. See e.g. F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Building, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1965) (broker 
cannot be held as insurer against the possibility that the buyer 
may become dissatisfied with his bargain and bring a lawsuit 
claiming the right of recision). Once Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens and the Hansens met their obligations under the listing 
agreements in procuring a potential buyer who, at that time, was 
apparently ready, willing and able, it is irrelevant to the breach 
of contract claim that the potential buyer or its assignee refused 
or were unable to close on the Property. Accordingly, the Court 
determines that the Mascaros could not prevail as a matter of law 
on their breach of contract claim if their position was solely that 
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens failed to procure 
a ready, willing and able buyer because the buyer that they did 
procure was not financially able to close on the Property. 
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However, the Mascaros appear to have an alternative argument 
that Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens breached 
paragraph 10 of the listing agreements by neglecting to list the 
Property through the Multiple Listing Service. The Court and 
opposing counsel first learned of this position during the course 
of oral argument, at which time the Mascaros' counsel indicated to 
the Court that deposition testimony had recently been adduced that 
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens never listed the 
Property through the Multiple Listing Service- The testimony 
alluded to by the Mascaros' counsel would clearly constitute a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the breach of 
contract claim. However, counsel never presented a transcript of 
the deposition testimony or excerpts of the same to the Court. 
Thus, the Court is left in the difficult position of having to rule 
solely on the representations of counsel, as an officer of the 
court, that such testimony was indeed adduced. While it is not 
desirable to raise issues in this manner, it appears nonetheless 
that the issue does exist and the facts relating to it are in 
dispute. In its discretion, the Court concludes that the Mascaros 
are not foreclosed, as a matter of law, from asserting a breach of 
contract claim. 
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2. Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants' Motion for $ymm$ry 
Judgment concerning the fraud and declaratory judgment claims are 
Cieniec?. 
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens claim that 
the Mascaros failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment. Rule 9(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure does specify that xx[i]n all averments of 
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." Fraud requires that a false 
representation of an existing material fact must be made knowingly 
or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, and 
there must be reasonable reliance resulting in the plaintiff's 
injury. Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984); Duaan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980) . The Utah Supreme Court has 
historically held, and continues to stress, that mere conclusory 
allegations in a pleading unsupported by a recitation of relevant 
surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or 
summary judgment. See Norton v.* Blackham, 669 P.2d 857. 859 (Utah 
1983); Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1974). 
In this case, however, the fraud claim set forth in the 
Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint incorporates 
averments that the Hansens, as agents of Wardley Better Homes and 
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Gardens, made misrepresentations concerning (1) the duration and 
scope of the listing agreements; (2) their expertise in structuring 
real estate transactions to qualify under §1031/ and (3) the 
exercise of the option to be contingent on the closing of the first 
40 acres of the Property. Furthermore, they allege that the 
misrepresentations were made with the intent of inducing them to 
rely on the representations by entering into the listing 
agreements. The Mascaros claim that they did in fact rely on these 
misrepresentations to their detriment because of the ultimate delay 
in the sale of the Property, their inability to collect earnest 
money deposit of $4,000 made by the potential buyer, and incurring 
attorney's fees and costs in dealing with the potential buyer. 
This is a sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts 
underlying the Mascaros' claim of fraud to support this Court's 
conclusion that the requirement of Rule 9(b) has been met. The 
Court therefore denies summary judgment as to both the fraud and 
the declaratory judgment claim. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied for the foregoing reasons and counsel 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: I am going to take under 
advisement the plaintiff's claim against the Mascaros. I 
want to review all of the documents and I will write a 
formal ruling with reference to my determination. I want 
to do it while the facts are fresh in my mind so will do 
that relatively quickly. 
As to Ms. Cannon, the Court finds no cause as 
to the claim of statutory violation. The Court finds 
that she did nothing improper ethically. In arriving at 
that determination and finding, I have relied heavily 
upon the totality of facts and circumstances and the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
I found Ms. Cannon herself to be credible in 
terms of explaining what had transpired, her responses to 
the same. I also found Mr. Butch Bailey to be a 
compelling witness on this point. 
With reference to the various claims against 
her, I find that there is no showing and plaintiff has 
not met its burden of proof in connection with the 
alleged contract interference, vis-a-vis, the Ahlin 
WetCor deal, the old Brodsky deal and the Bolin deal. 
As to the board listing agreement with the 
Mascaros, that is the one thing I'm taking under 
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advisement with reference to Ms. Cannon, finding that the 
plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof with 
reference to Ms. Cannon on conversion and finding that 
they have not met their burden of proof as I've 
previously indicated on the alleged statutory violation. 
I cannot find that there has been any showing 
of impropriety in terms of how she's handled this of an 
ethical nature. 
I will make a ruling with reference to the 
remaining issues as quickly as I can. I will indicate to 
Counsel that I have another trial, a jury trial, set to 
begin on Monday and hearings in connection with that 
tomorrow and I have a criminal trial the following week, 
but my plan would be to get to this as quickly as I can. 
I would like to say to all of the attorneys 
involved, all seven of you, that it has been a distinct 
privilege and pleasure to have you all here. I have 
found that all of you have shown that you have engaged in 
the highest degree of professionalism and preparedness 
throughout. There has not been one time during this 
trial when counsel has not had available the appropriate 
documents, even in a case which, as Mr. Sabin so well 
pointed out, has been document intensive. 
And each one of you were well prepared to move 
forward on these issues and the degree of professionalism 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940907000 
This case came before the Court for trial beginning on June 8, 
1998, and continuing through June 11, 1998. The Court having 
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received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the 
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action 
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that 
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative 
Code. Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's 
conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of 
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain 
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch" 
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible • The Court also ruled 
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection 
with their claim that defendant Tracy Cannon intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with 
respect to the Wetcor/Michael Ahlin deal, the Michael 
Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual 
discussion below). Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant 
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the 
defendant Mascaros' property to the plaintiff constituted 
conversion. The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended 
Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were 
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taken under advisement by the Court for further, more in-depth 
consideration, 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This Court finds that credible testimony adduced at trial, 
establishes the following facts. The Mascaros ("Mascaros") 
defendants and third-party plaintiffs, were first contacted by 
third-party defendant Aries Hansen ("Mr. Hansen") in the summer of 
1993. Mr. Hansen, who represented himself to be the agent of the 
plaintiff and counterdefendant Wardley Better Homes & Gardens 
("Wardley"), inquired whether the Mascaros were interested in-
selling approximately 128 acres of real property which is the 
subject of this lawsuit. Mr. Hansen informed the Mascaros that he 
was looking for property in that area for Michael L. Ahlin ("Mr. 
Ahlin"), President of Impact Development Corporation d/b/a Wetcor. 
After his initial meeting with the Mascaros, Mr. Hansen met 
with defendant and third-party plaintiff Sheri Mascaro ("Mrs. 
Mascaro") and requested that she sign an Option agreement. Mrs. 
Mascaro signed, but did not date, the Option agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1). The terms of this Option agreement included a 20 day 
duration and gave Mr. Hansen, and his wife, third-party defendant 
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen"), or their assigns, the right to 
purchase the Mascaros' property. 
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and third-party 
plaintiff Leland Mascaro ("Mr. Mascaro") was the actual owner of 
the property, he asked the Mascaros to sign a second Option 
agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The terms of the second Option 
agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first 
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros. According to 
the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro 
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21") 
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property. The Century 21 
listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr. 
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration. 
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the 
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility. To the contrary, 
the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr. 
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party 
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the 
Century 21 Agreement. Mrs. Mascaro obtained the exemption 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993. This exemption was 
acquired before the second Option agreement was executed. 
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did 
not make an immediate offer, Mr. Hansen engaged in other actions 
with the Mascaros, including having them write a letter 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on 
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal. Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that 
this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by 
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a 
fabrication. 
On October 12, 1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property 
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of 
the same date. In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) 
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen. The Court finds 
this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously 
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively. 
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent 
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual 
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature. Also 
of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature. A hand-
written notation on the top of this contract expressly states that 
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it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor. 
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal 
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen. Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the 
Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original 
real estate purchase contract which included a provision for 
commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin 
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16). 
Based on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr. 
Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him. In addition, 
the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed 
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time. 
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home 
with a number of documents. At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an 
Option Agreement (Defendant's Exhibit 89), a Limited Agency 
Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), and four listing 
agreements ("Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Land Data Input Forms (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 20). In his 
testimony, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that in preparing these 
documents the night before, he had predated many of them. The 
Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was 
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on 
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel. It appears 
to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents 
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of 
the second Option agreement. It further appears from the Mascaros' 
testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present 
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase 
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the 
remainder of the land. However, because the Mascaros and Mr. 
Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be 
willing to purchase, the principle terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract were left blank. In addition, only the first of 
the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date. 
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 17A), in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement 
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen. This Listing Agreement was 
set to expire on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's 
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen 
altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993 
to November 15, 1994. This finding is based on the credible 
testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents 
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where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the 
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the 
change in the expiration date has no initials. The Court further 
finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements, 
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were 
filled in by Mr. Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature, 
with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established 
that Mr. Hansen's conduct in changing and/or writing in the 
expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the 
approval of the Mascaros. In addition, the dates alluded to and 
written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and 
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one 
day. 
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign 
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
and Mrs. Hansen accepted an earnest money check for $4,000. 
Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr. 
Ahlin subsequently failed. After an attempt to arbitrate the 
matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000 
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees. 
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This Court also finds that around this same time, another 
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of 
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros. Mr. 
Brodsky testified that he proposed purchasing the property in 
stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal 
agreement on the sale. , However, before the agreement was 
finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of 
the property had occurred. In September 1994, the Mascaros 
signed a one year listing agreement with defendant Cannon 
Associates. In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to defendant 
Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon"). The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed 
on this property on May 11, 1995. Ms. Cannon received a commission 
from the sale of $115,338.16. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court determines that the listing- agreem^ntfr entered 
into between Wardley and the Mascaros are roicfofrlg 
because they were secured by fraud in the inducement. 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Wardley claims that the 
Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by 
refusing to pay Wardley the 7% commission provided for in the 
Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to Ms. Cannon. 
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within 
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements. According to Wardley, 
when the sale on the property to Ms. Cannon closed, the contractual 
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied. 
In their Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint against 
Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to 
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations 
made to them by Mr. Hansen. The representations which the Mascaros 
claim were fraudulent are: (1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he 
would only receive a commission for the sale of the Mascaros' 
property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2) 
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and 
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase. The Mascaros also claim 
that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the 
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the 
property. 
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions 
made by another, Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), 
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid 
the contract. Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
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798, 801-04 (Utah 1980). The nine essential elements of fraudulent 
inducement (fraud) are: 
"(1) that a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to his injury and damage." 
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800. 
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent 
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of 
its elements. This Court finds most significant the fact that 
there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing 
Agreements and the Mascaros' expressed intention to limit Mr. 
Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the 
duration of his representation to one day. These inconsistencies 
can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently 
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to one-
party and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign 
the Listing Agreements. As part of his fraudulent scheme, the 
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Court finds that Mr. Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date 
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added 
expiration dates to the remaining three Listing Agreements to 
reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration. It appears 
Mr. Hansen unilaterally modified the Listing Agreements to 
improperly expand the scope of his representation beyond that 
contemplated by the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's 
modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a 
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of 
necessary legal advice. Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which 
the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing 
incomplete drafts of the Listing Agreements during a Sunday 
meeting, when their legal counsel was apparently unavailable, 
because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for 
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the 
final version of the Listing Agreements would contain the 
limitations they had discussed. In addition, the Mascaros' 
testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such 
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr. 
Hansen had their best interests in mind. On this topic, the Court 
found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care 
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning 
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr, Hansen's representations and the 
opportunity for deception by Mr. Hansen. The Court finds that Mr. 
Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a 
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew 
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would 
be unlikely to be available. 
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they 
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was 
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality 
of credible trial testimony. For instance, the Sale Agency 
Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and 
signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the 
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a 
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor." Further, 
the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing 
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he 
could obtain a one-party exemption. Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs. 
Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent 
with the Mascaros' express reservations that their listing 
agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and 
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be 
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing. 
Next, it is significant to the Court that the change in the 
expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed. 
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by 
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date 
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the 
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge 
or permission. The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents 
speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing 
Agreements only because of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent 
misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and 
scope of these agreements. In reaching this determination, the 
Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including 
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters 
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that 
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not 
have access to their legal counsel. The existence of these proven 
facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing 
Agreements. This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be 
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unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured 
through fraudulent inducement. 
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on 
which the Mascaros could avoid liability under the Listing 
Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake. However, since the 
Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds 
of fraudulent inducement, the Court deems it unnecessary to 
consider alternative theories. 
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim 
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements. Specifically, 
the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable. 
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms. 
Cannon interfered with Wardley's economic relations with respect to 
the Mascaros. Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable, 
Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros, 
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere. 
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, the Court's ruling that the Listing Agreements are 
unenforceable renders moot the Mascaros' claim that they are 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms 
of the Listing Agreements. In other words, in disaffirming the 
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terms of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros cannot seek to 
selectively reinstate only certain portions of the Listing 
Agreements which are favorable to them. The same concept applies 
to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the 
Listing Agreements. As stated previously, since fraudulent 
inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are 
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley. In 
so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the 
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were 
executed. 
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it 
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their 
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing 
Agreements are void. Moreover, while the Mascaros may have 
suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether 
their property would be sold, there is no evidence that this 
distress resulted in any compensatory damages. As a corollary, the 
Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a 
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property 
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the 
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Ahlin/Wetcor deal. Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros' 
claim for damages. 
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings 
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling 
within fifteen (15) days. 
Dated this (^/^^F^"f^^gust./^l 998. 
k^ P( 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI 
MASCARO and TRACEY CANNON, 
Defendants. 




WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Counterdefendant. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES 
HANSEN, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 940907000 
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The Court has before it a Notice to Submit, filed pursuant to 
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with 
defendants' Tracey Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. (Cannon) 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Request for Oral 
Argument and defendants/counterclaimants/third-party plaintiffs' 
Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro's (Mascaros) Request for 
Attorney Fees and Request for Oral Argument. The Court having now 
reviewed Cannons' and the Mascaros' Motions, Memoranda in support 
and in opposition thereto, rules as stated herein. 
At the outset, the Court notes that both Cannon and the 
Mascaros have requested oral argument. This request is denied. 
The Court is not satisfied that there is a need or basis to justify 
setting this matter for oral argument. Both sides have done a fine 
job of stating their positions in the pleadings and the Court is 
very conversant with the facts, law and arguments. 
In their respective motions, Cannon and the Mascaros request 
attorney's fees pursuant to .Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56. Section 
78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Under this 
statute, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court determines 
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that three requirements have been met: (1) the party seeking fees 
prevailed; (2) the claim or defense asserted by the opposing party 
was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad 
faith. With regard to each of these elements, the trial court must 
make specific findings._J3££ Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) ("Specific findings further the ends 
of justice by allowing appeals courts to better review the trial 
court's award."). 
Both Cannon and the Mascaros assert that the Court should 
grant them attorney's fees under § 78-27-56(1) because they are the 
prevailing parties, and because Wardley's claims against them were 
meritless and asserted in bad faith. In support of this argument, 
Cannon and the Mascaros rely on this Court's finding that third-
party defendant Aries Hansen improperly modified the listing 
agreements with the Mascaros. Cannon and the Mascaros argue that 
Mr. Hansen's misconduct should be imputed to Wardley under the 
theory of agency or respondeat superior and that Wardley is liable 
to Cannon and the Mascaros for having to defend against Wardley's 
meritless suit. 
First, this Court does not agree that Wardley's suit was 
"without merit". Specifically, Cannon and the Mascaros have failed 
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to show that Wardley' s claims under the listing agreements were 
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in 
law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
While the Court subsequently determined that the listing agreements 
entered into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because 
of Mr. Hansen's misconduct, the legality of the listing agreements, 
a mixed fact and legal question, was not entirely clear. The Court 
reached its decision only after extensively evaluating the trial 
testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents entered 
into evidence, in light of the law. Wardley has represented that 
it did not have knowledge of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent activity and 
strongly believed that it had a claim for unpaid commissions. 
Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements, 
which on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed 
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight and the benefit of approximately 
four days of trial testimony. 
Furthermore, the Court determines that Wardley's Complaint was 
not asserted or pursued with the requisite bad faith. See Cady, 
671 P.2d at 151-52. "In order to find that a party "lacked good 
faith," or in other words, acted in "bad faith," the trial court 
must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (1) 
on 
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the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to or 
acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would 
hinder, delay, or defraud others." Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); See also Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (citation 
omitted). The record does not provide any credible support for a 
finding that Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud, 
or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of Cannon or the 
Mascaros. As a result, this Court cannot find bad faith. 
Consequently, the Court determines that Cannon and the Mascaros do 
not appear to be entitled to attorney's fees under §78-27-56. 
Additionally, the totality of facts and circumstances don't point 
to this as equitable. Accordingly, Cannon's Motion and the 
Mascaros' Request is denied. 
Counsel for Wardley is to prepare an Order consistent with, 
but not limited to, this Court's Ruling, and submit the same to the 
Court for review and signature. 
Finally, the Court seeks clarification as to whether Wardley 
is still being represented by the law firm of Nielsen & Senior. 
The Court has received a Notice to Submit filed by the law firm of 
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Nielsen & Senior in connection with their Motion to Withdraw from 
representing the Hansens. While Nielsen & Senior is apparently 
seeking to withdraw as counsel only for the Hansens, it now appears 
that Wardley has retained the law firm of Scalley & Reading to 
represent it in this matter. The Court has received pleadings from 
Scalley & Reading on behalf of Wardley. (See Memorandum in 
Opposition to Mascaro and Cannon's Motions for Attorney's Fees). 
Until further clarification is received and an Order entered, this 
Court will continue to consider Nielsen & Senior as counsel for 
Wardley. They are directed to contact the clients and Scalley & 
Reading to clarify this issue. 
Dated this / w day of December, 19#8 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE , -.'," J" 
4'.' A" 
*\ -^  li*-' t^ r-
' r* ^ 
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SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO, ; 
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER DENYING 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) Civil No. 940907000 CN 
) Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro 
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's 
fees from Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"), 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to 
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having 
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
7. r -fct 
APR ? 1 1939 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Cannons and Mascaros claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56 (1) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and asserted in bad 
faith. 
2. Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit." 
3. Even though the listing agreements entered between Wardley and the 
Mascaros were voidable because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing 
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which were not entirely clear. 
There was no evidence presented that Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's 
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that it had a valid 
claim for unpaid commissions. The evidence indicated: (a) Wardley had an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (c) Wardley did not intend to or act with knowledge that its 
activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Cannon and Mascaros failed to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were 
"frivolous," or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
2. Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith. 
3. The totality of facts and circumstances would make it inequitable to 





DATED this C 7 dav of March? 1999. 
By the Court: 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
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